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Federal and state law regarding disqualification (aka recusal) of judges is both
similar and different, requiring that counsel be aware of federal and state statutes,
the Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct and even constitutional considerations. I
Reasonable Question as
to Impartiality
Although 28 U.S.C. §144
permits what appears to be automatic
disqualification upon submission of
an affidavit of judicial bias, the statute
has been construed narrowly and is
seldom used. The workhorse for federal
judicial recusal is 28 U.S.C. §455, which
requires disqualification where the
judge has "a personal bias or prejudice
concerning a party" §455(a) and
provides that a judge "shall disqualify
himself in any proceeding in which
his impartiality might be reasonably
questioned." Nevada Code of Judicial
Conduct Rule 2.11(A) contains the
same language. The test is not whether
the individual judge is actually biased
or thinks he or she cannot be fair.
Rather, the test is whether a reasonable,
adequately informed observer would
have reasonable concerns ahout the
judge's ability to be impartial. This
ground for recusal may be waived, but
28 U.S.C. §455(e) requires the waiver
be preceded by a full disclosure. Nev.
Jud. Code Rule 2.11(C) requires similar
disclosure.
Reconciling the "Duty to Sit"
and Disqualification
The legislative history of 28
U.S.C. §455 makes it quite clear that
Congress intended to eliminate the
"duty to sit" doctrine, but Nevada case
law continues to recognize it. See, e.g.,
Ham v. District Court, 566 P.2d 420,
424 (Nev. 1977). But the court has not
commented extensively on the doctrine
in nearly 10 years, and in January 2010
it adopted a revised Code of Judicial
Conduct that eliminated the earlier
code's express commentary favoring
the doctrine. See also Millen v. District
Court 148 P.3d 694. 699-700 (Nev.
2006)(also describing operation of
recusal lists maintained by state judges)
(duty to sit must yield to concerns
over fairness and impartiality as well
as litigant's right to chosen counsel).
The duty-to-sit concept should not
be interpreted as suggesting undue
resistance to recusal but merely that
judges should not use disqualification
as an excuse for avoiding disfavored
cases. Rule 2.7 (titled "Responsibility to
Decide") states that a judge "shall hear
and decide matters assigned to the judge
except when disqualification is required
by Rule 2.11 or other law" (emphasis
added). Comment [1] to Rule 2.7
explains that the admonition of the rule is
designed to ensure that "a judge not use
disqualification to avoid cases that present
difficult, controversial, or unpopular issues
or involve difficult, controversial, or
unpopular parties or lawyers."
continued on page 19
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Enumerated Grounds for
Disqualification and the
Federal-State Difference Re:
Financial Interests
Nevada Code 2.11(B) and 28 U.S.C.
§445(b) are virtually identical in setting
forth grounds for required disqualification
on the basis of what might be described
as financial, professional and family
affiliations. Both make disqualification
automatic when the judge:
* Has "personal knowledge
of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceeding" §455(b)
(1); Rule 2.11(A)(1);
* Served as a lawyer in the matter or
the judge's former firm is involved
in a matter or a lawyer in the firm
is a "material witness" in the matter
§455(b)(2); Rule 2.11(A)(2);
* Worked on the matter as a
government attorney or other
employee, is a material witness
in the matter or "expressed an
opinion" on the merits of a case
while serving in government;
§455(b)(3); Rule 2.11(B)(6)(b);
* Has a financial interest (either
individually or as a fiduciary) in
the "subject matter in controversy
or in a party to the proceeding" or
has "any other interest that could
be substantially affected by the
outcome of the proceeding," a
ground for disqualification that
also applies to the judge's spouse
or "minor child residing in the
household;" §455(b)(4); Rule
2.11((A)(3); and
The Rule 2.11 language
refers specifically to an
"economic interest," defined
as "ownership of more
than a de minimis legal
or equitable interest" and
expressly defined not to
include individual holdings
within a mutual fund, interest
in securities owned by a
charitable organization,
bank deposits or government
securities. In other words,
state law takes a less rigid
attitude toward financial
conflicts than does federal
law.
Has a spouse or a relative "within
the third degree of relationship
[first cousins or closer]" or a
cousin's spouse who is a party in
the matter or an officer, director
or trustee of a party; a lawyer
in the proceeding; is likely to
be a material witness; or "[is]
known by the judge to have an
interest that could be substantially
affected by the outcome of the
proceeding." §455(b)(5); Rule
2.11(A)(2)(also requiring that
the interest be "more than a de
minirnis interest").
The federal statute (28 U.S.C.
§455(e)) expressly provides that the
financial grounds for disqualification
are not waivable and that the financial
interests of the judge, spouse or family
need only be slight. Although the federal
financial disqualification rules are rigid,
the judge must "know" of the conflict.
But 28 U.S.C. §455(c) requires the
judge to "inform himself of his personal
and fiduciary financial interests" and
to "make a reasonable effort" to know
about family finances. Where the judge
becomes aware of the conflict "after
substantial judicial time has been devoted
to the matter" disqualification "is not
required if the judge ... divests himself
or herself of the [disqualing] interest."
See 28 U.S.C. §455(f).
Nevada statutes may also apply.
NRS 1.225 and NRS 1.230 provide
for recusal "when implied bias exists
in any of the following respects" and
then lists grounds similar to those set
forth in Rule 2.11(A) (and 28 U.S.C.
455(b)) but less comprehensively.
The more recently adopted Code of
Judicial Conduct provides a broader
guide for assessing whether counsel
has a legitimate ground for seeking
disqualification. Procedure for seeking
recusal is set forth in NRS 1.235.
Specific Differences Between State
and Federal Disqualification
Peremptory Challenges
One major difference between
federal and Nevada disqualification is
that Nevada provides litigants with a
right of automatic disqualification of the
originally assigned judge: a "preemptory"
challenge that can be used only once by a
litigant and does not preclude subsequent
motions for disqualification for cause.
Nevada Civil Rule 48.1 states that in any
civil action "each side is entitled, as a
matter of right, to one change of judge"
(emphasis added). It also sets forth the
procedure for exercising the right or
peremptory challenge and established the
current fee of $450. The right evaporates
once the judge "has made any ruling on a
contested matter or commenced hearing
any contested matter in the action." Nev.
R. Civ. P. 48.1(5). There is no peremptory
challenge right regarding "any judge who
is assigned to or accepts a case from the
overflow calendar or against a senior
or pro tempore judge assigned by the
supreme court to hear any civil matter"
(Rule 48.1(5)). Further, Eighth Judicial
District Court Rule 1.65(b) expressly
states that peremptory challenge is
unavailable in construction defect cases.
Campaign Contributions
Judicial elections raise the question
of whether campaign support by a party or
counsel can constitute grounds for recusal.
Campaign contribution alone does not
require disqualification. See City ofLas
Vegas Downtown RedevelopmentAgency
v. District Court, 5 P.3d 1059, 1062-63
(Nev. 2000).
Campaign Statements
Nevada requires disqualification
where the judge, as either judge or
judicial candidate, makes a statement
other than in a judicial proceeding,
decision or opinion "that commits or
appears to commit the judge to reach a
particular result or rule in a particular
continued on page 21
Judicialof
ud ca -PRO BONODisquaification:
Federal-State Distinctions The State Bar of Nevada Board of'Governorsand the
Access to Justice Conmnission extend a special1 thankls to the
way in the proceeding in controversy." See Nev. Code Jud.
Conduct Rule 2.11(A)(5). However, Republican Party of the Legal Aid Center of Southern Nea, Washoc Legal
Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) and its progeny Services, Nevada Lega Services and Volunteer Attorneys for
place some First Amendment restrictions upon state Rura Nevadans, and those who donated their time to work at
regulation of judicial campaign speech. ents lk Ask-A-La er and Lawyer in the Librar.
Ernie Adler Kara Hendricks Brandi Planet
Disqualification Required by the Due Process Alyssa Akiestad Jennifer Hostetler Matthew Policastro
Protections of the U.S. Constitution Jennifer Arledge Edward Kaien Corinne Price
Eu~nice Beattie Courtney Netter Tracy Raul
In rare cases, the U.S. Constitution may require Brian Blackham Carly Krygier Josh Reid
disqualification of an assignedjudge. See, e.g., Tumey v. Ohio, Jonathan BLum Noah Kuschel Jennifer Roberts
273 U.S. 510 (1927)(unconstitutional forjudge to hear case when Jennifer Carvalho Andrew Kynaston Amanda Roberts
salary paid from fines collected in such cases). The Constitution Ebru Cetin Michael Levine L. Christopher Rose
requires recusal where "the probability of actual bias on the part Melanie Chapman Jesse Livingston Beth Rosenblum
of the decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable." Jonathan Chung Brittany Llewellyn Beverly Salhanick
See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). In Caperton v. Jeffrey Cogan Cliff Marcek Savera Sandh
A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009), the court required Amanda Connor James Martines Ava Schaefer
recusal of a West Virginia justice who received roughly $3.5 Robert Dickerson Racheal Mastel Brianna Smith
million of campaign support from the CEO of a coal company Fraes n Fn Mget Mcatc Nancy Sow
appealing a multi-million-dollar adverse judgment. Accord, Nedda Ghandi Kimberly Medina Jaimie Stilz
Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016)(due process Alex Ghibaudo Janet Merrill Mary Tran
required recusal of state court justice who prosecuted defendant Heather Goodlett David Mmc Rachel Tygret
prior to joining the bench)("The Court asks ... whether as an Marjorie Guymon Brian Nelson Marshal Willick
objective matter, the average judge in his position is likely to Ryan Hamilton Michiko Nozawa- Amy Wilson
be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional potential for Trevor Hatfield Joffe
bias")(internal quotation marks omitted). Robert Hempen
In State v. Rippo, a defendant convicted in 1993 argued
that the trial judge should have recused due to an ongoing Attorneys who participated in Ask-A-Lawyer,
criminal investigation of the judge involving allegations of Lawyer in the Library or other clinics:
bribery in which the prosecutors were involved. See Rippo v.
State, 946 P.2d 1017 (Nev. 1997)(affirming original conviction Ilan Acherman Brittany N. Cooper Courtney M. OMara
on appeal; rejecting judicial bias claim). There is also the Andriea A. Aden Melissa Corral Jennifer Poynter-
argument that the judge (eventually acquitted) would favor the Jason Aivaz Michelle Darquea- Willis
prosecution in non-bribed cases to cover his tracks. This theory Alyssa Aklestad Kaplan Jennifer M. RichardsMichael G. Alonso Brian L. Davenport Glenn Schepps
of "camouflaging bias" was recognized as potentially viable Mary Bacon Eric Dobberstein Tamatha R
inBracyv. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899 (1997). The Nevada Elizabeth J. Bassett Cherie Fletter Schreinert
Supreme Court rejected Rippo's argument (Rippo v. State, Charlotte Bible Raquel Fulghum Gary R. Silverman
368 P.3d 729 (Nev. 2016)) but was reversed in Rippo v. Robert Blau Janice Jacovino Cassie Stratford
Baker, 137 S. Ct. 905, 907 (2017)(courts must ask "whether, Brianna Bower Gabrielle Jones Kevin Sutehall
considering all the circumstances alleged, the risk of bias Amy Buchanan Gene Kaufmann Marissa Temple
was too high to be constitutionally tolerable"). See also R etin Aron McKonld Stn Atkins
Rippo v. State, 423 P.3d 1084, 1102 (Nev. 2018)(on remand) Jessica Chong Bryan Martin Darren Welsh
(discovery and hearing needed to examine allegations of James Claflin Mikyla J. Miller Shann Winesett
judicial bias claim); Rippo v. State, 2018 Nev. LEXIS 111 Lesley Cohen Susan Noyce Chuck Zumpft
(Dec. 7, 2018)(denying rehearing). NL
BOLD honors multiple cases accepted and/or sessions conducted within the month.
Ee le t Kara ens Brand Plat
As Aesad Jnnifer Hos eler ate ast ro o al
ener redge Edar Kain oi rinePrice
March 2019 Nevada Lawyer 2
